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Short-termism as optimal experimentation policy

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  • Brusco, Sandro

Abstract

Models of managerial short-termism rely on a number of assumption, such as limited availability of capital, fixed compensation schemes and an additive impact of managerial ability on revenue. We discuss the role of these assumption in generating short-termism. We show that when managerial ability ha a multiplicative impact on revenue then the first best investment policy may require the implementation of short-term projects with negative NPV in order to generate information on managerial ability that can be exploited in later periods. We also show that, when the firm is free to design the compensation scheme, the first best is attained even if only short-term contracts are allowed. Short-termism is therefore the result of an optimal experimentation policy rather than the consequence of managerial misbehavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Short-termism as optimal experimentation policy," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6522, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:wbrepe:6522
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stein, Jeremy C, 1988. "Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
    2. Narayanan, M. P., 1996. "Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 467-491, December.
    3. Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
    4. Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart i Costa, 1986. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(4), pages 835-860.
    5. Narayanan, M P, 1985. "Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1469-1484, December.
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    Managerial compensation;

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