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Das zukünftige Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Demokratie aus ökonomischer Sicht

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  • Gebhard Kirchgässner

Abstract

Whether democracy or capitalism should have normative priority depends on the philosophi- cal point of view but also how both are defined. The more rele vant perspective is, however, the positive one. Formally, politics dominate, bu t the economy often dominates de facto be- cause political decisions against interests of powerful economic players might cause high so- cietal costs. Since the downfall of the Iron Wall capitalism spread out much more than democ- racy. Future development might strongly depend on the development of the new authoritarian market economies: Can high growth continue wh ile political rights are largely suppressed, or do they have to concede more and more to democratic rights in order to ensure further eco- nomic growth? One would like to see the latter one, but this is by no means sure.

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  • Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2015. "Das zukünftige Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Demokratie aus ökonomischer Sicht," CREMA Working Paper Series 2015-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2015-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capitalism; Democracy; Economic Development; Market Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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