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Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution May Benefit the TV Viewers

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  • Stennek, Johan

Abstract

Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded.

Suggested Citation

  • Stennek, Johan, 2007. "Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution May Benefit the TV Viewers," CEPR Discussion Papers 6072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6072
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Madden & Mario Pezzino, 2013. "Sports League Quality, Broadcaster TV Rights Bids and Wholesale Regulation of Sports Channels," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1304, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    2. Harald Nygard Bergh & Hans Jarle Kind & Bjørn-Atle Reme & Lars Sørgard, 2012. "Competition between Content Distributors in Two-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 3885, CESifo.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Stephen Martin, 2017. "Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 95-118, March.
    4. Christiaan Hogendorn & Stephen Ka Yat Yuen, 2009. "Platform Competition With ‘Must‐Have’ Components," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 294-318, June.
    5. Juan José Ganuza & María Fernanda Viecens, 2010. "Exclusive Content and the Next Generation Networks," Working Papers 2010-21, FEDEA.
    6. Viktória Kocsis & Paul Bijl, 2007. "Network neutrality and the nature of competition between network operators," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-184, August.
    7. Hans Jarle Kind & Tore Nilssen & Lars Sørgard, 2010. "Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3004, CESifo.
    8. Anna D'Annunzio, 2013. "Vertical Integration in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusive Provision and Program Quality," DIAG Technical Reports 2013-16, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    9. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Stephen Martin, 2017. "Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 95-118, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advertising; Bargaining; Exclusive contracts; investment; Quality; Two-sided market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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