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Race to the Top or Bottom? Corporate Governance, Freedom of Reincorporation and Competition in Law

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  • Mayer, Colin
  • Fluck, Zsuzsanna

Abstract

This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms? technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms? reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over firms? reincorporation then competitive deregulation and ?runs to the bottom? ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms? choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayer, Colin & Fluck, Zsuzsanna, 2005. "Race to the Top or Bottom? Corporate Governance, Freedom of Reincorporation and Competition in Law," CEPR Discussion Papers 5133, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5133
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuznetsov, Andrei & Jacob, Marcus, 2015. "Institutional adjustment and change at the firm level: A varieties of capitalism perspective," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 165-177.
    2. Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten & Mucciarelli, Federico M. & Schuster, Edmund & Siems, Mathias, 2018. "Why do businesses incorporate in other EU Member States? An empirical analysis of the role of conflict of laws rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 14-27.
    3. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Contractual corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 166-182, June.
    4. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-027 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2010. "Корпоративно Управление На Финансови Групи (Спазвай И Обяснявай) [Corporate Governance of Financial Groups (Comply and Explain)]," MPRA Paper 52249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Institutional competition, political process and holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-027, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    7. repec:cuf:journl:y:2013:v:14:i:1:n:2:albuquerque is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Rui Albuquerque & Jianjun Miao, 2013. "CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 443-479, November.
    9. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique, 2008. "Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 615-627, September.
    10. Mayer, Colin & Becht, Marco & Wagner, Hannes, 2006. "Where Do Firms Incorporate?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5875, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Njoya, W., 2010. "Employee Ownership in the European Company: Reflexive Law, Reincorporation and Escaping Codetermination," Working Papers wp416, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Competition between legal systems; Freedom or reincorporation; Shareholder protection; Technology choice; Managerial private benefits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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