IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/4643.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Innovative (Imitative) Effort and Tariffs in Developing Countries: Policy Implications of Different Market Conducts, Government

Author

Listed:
  • Zigic, Kresimir
  • Ionascu, Delia

Abstract

We analyse a simple ?tariffs-cum-foreign competition? policy targeted at enhancing the competitive position of a domestic, developing country firm that competes with its developed country counterpart on the domestic market and that carries out innovative (imitative) effort. We evaluate this policy with respect to social welfare, type of oligopoly conduct, information requirement, time consistency and possibility of manipulative behaviour and conclude that the most robust policy set-up is that in which the domestic government is unable to pre-commit to the level of its policy. Finally, we examine this policy, allowing for asymmetric information, and show that the corresponding social welfare may be higher than under perfect information set-up.

Suggested Citation

  • Zigic, Kresimir & Ionascu, Delia, 2004. "Innovative (Imitative) Effort and Tariffs in Developing Countries: Policy Implications of Different Market Conducts, Government," CEPR Discussion Papers 4643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4643
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP4643
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal tariff protection; Government non-commitment regime; Innovative (imitative) effort; Symmetric versus asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4643. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.