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A Rational Expectations Theory of the Kink in Earnings Reports

Author

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  • Kandel, Eugene
  • Kadan, Ohad
  • Guttman, Ilan

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these pre-specified targets seems to be smooth. We propose a game theoretic model explaining this phenomenon. In our model, investors form expectations of such a manipulative behaviour by the manager. Given these expectations, the best response of the manager is to fulfill the investors? expectations, resulting in a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings reports. Our model generates several new empirical predictions regarding the existence of the kink, its size and its location relative to the distribution of earnings reports.

Suggested Citation

  • Kandel, Eugene & Kadan, Ohad & Guttman, Ilan, 2004. "A Rational Expectations Theory of the Kink in Earnings Reports," CEPR Discussion Papers 4613, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4613
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Managerial compensation; Stock-based compensation; Earnings reports; Earnings management; Analysts forecasts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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