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Robin Hood's Compromise: Land Reforms, Inequality, Redistribution and Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Levy, Gilat
  • Bandiera, Oriana

Abstract

This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers? welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ?to the tiller? it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Gilat & Bandiera, Oriana, 2004. "Robin Hood's Compromise: Land Reforms, Inequality, Redistribution and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 4410, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4410
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    Cited by:

    1. Bandiera Oriana & Levy Gilat, 2004. "Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land reforms; Inequality; Redistribution; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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