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Recession Aversion, Output and the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon Model

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  • Gerlach, Stefan

Abstract

This Paper explores the relationship between the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon model and models with asymmetric policy preferences. While both yield an inflation bias, recession aversion dampens the output effects of contractionary supply shocks. Some inflation may therefore reflect policy preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "Recession Aversion, Output and the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 3687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3687
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    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Cukierman, A., 1999. "The Inflation Bias Result Revisited," Papers 38-99, Tel Aviv.
    3. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2004. "The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 91-107, February.
    4. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    6. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, April.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Diana & Pierre‐Guillaume Méon, 2008. "Monetary Policy in the Presence of Asymmetric Wage Indexation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(1), pages 69-90, July.
    2. Sudhanshu Kumar & Naveen Srinivasan & Muthiah Ramachandran, 2012. "A time‐varying parameter model of inflation in India," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(1), pages 25-50, April.
    3. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan‐Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Does money matter in the ECB strategy? New evidence based on ECB communication," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 16-31, January.
    4. Qin, Ting & Enders, Walter, 2008. "In-sample and out-of-sample properties of linear and nonlinear Taylor rules," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 428-443, March.
    5. Michael J. Lamla & Damjan Pfajfar & Lea Rendell, 2019. "Inflation and deflationary biases in inflation expectations," BIS Working Papers 789, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Alex Cukierman & Stefan Gerlach, 2003. "The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 541-565, September.
    7. Doyle, Matthew & Falk, Barry, 2010. "Do asymmetric central bank preferences help explain observed inflation outcomes?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 527-540, June.
    8. Srinivasan, Naveen & Jain, Sumit & Ramachandran, M., 2009. "Monetary policy and the behaviour of inflation in India: Is there a need for institutional reform?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 13-24, January.
    9. Alvaro Aguiar & Manuel Martins, 2008. "Testing for asymmetries in the preferences of the euro-area monetary policymaker," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(13), pages 1651-1667.
    10. Tambakis Demosthenes N., 2009. "Optimal Monetary Policy with a Convex Phillips Curve," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, June.
    11. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, September.
    12. Naveen Srinivasan & Vidya Mahambare & M. Ramachandran, 2008. "Dynamics of inflation in India: does the new inflation bias hypothesis provide an explanation?," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 199-212.
    13. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Does money matter in the ECB strategy?," KOF Working papers 06-125, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    14. Alexander Perruchoud, 2009. "Estimating a Taylor Rule with Markov Switching Regimes for Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 145(II), pages 187-220, June.
    15. Shen, Chung-Hua & Lin, Kun-Li & Guo, Na, 2016. "Hawk or dove: Switching regression model for the monetary policy reaction function in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 94-111.
    16. Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    17. Stefan Gerlach & John Lewis, 2014. "Zero lower bound, ECB interest rate policy and the financial crisis," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 865-886, May.
    18. Ahmad Hassan Ahmad & Stephen Brown, 2017. "Re-examining the ECB’s two-pillar monetary policy strategy: Are there any deviations during and the pre-financial crisis periods?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 585-607, August.
    19. Totzek, Alexander & Wohltmann, Hans-Werner, 2010. "Barro-Gordon revisited: reputational equilibria in a New Keynesian model," Economics Working Papers 2010-04, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric policy reactions; Inflation bias; Reaction functions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General

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