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Imperfect Market Monitoring and SOES Trading

Author

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  • Foucault, Thierry
  • Röell, Ailsa A
  • Sandås, Patrik

Abstract

We develop a model of price formation in a dealership market where monitoring of the information flow requires costly effort. The result is imperfect monitoring, which creates profit opportunities for speculators, who do not act as dealers but simply monitor the information flow and quote updates in order to pick off 'stale quotes'. Externalities associated with monitoring can help to sustain non-competitive spreads. We show that protecting dealers against the execution of stale quotes can result in larger spreads and be detrimental to price discovery due to externalities in monitoring. A reduction in the minimum quoted depth will reduce the spread and speculators' trading frequency. Our analysis is relevant for the SOES debate given that the behaviour of speculators in our model is very similar to the alleged behaviour of the real world SOES 'bandits'.

Suggested Citation

  • Foucault, Thierry & Röell, Ailsa A & Sandås, Patrik, 1999. "Imperfect Market Monitoring and SOES Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 2265, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    2. Harris, Jeffrey H. & Schultz, Paul H., 1998. "The trading profits of SOES bandits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 39-62, October.
    3. Kandel, Eugene & M. Marx, Leslie, 1999. "Odd-eighth avoidance as a defense against SOES bandits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 85-102, January.
    4. Michael J. Barclay & William G. Christie & Jeffrey H. Harris & Eugene Kandel & Paul H. Schultz, 1999. "Effects of Market Reform on the Trading Costs and Depths of Nasdaq Stocks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 1-34, February.
    5. Kandel, Eugene & Marx, Leslie M., 1997. "Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 61-89, July.
    6. Battalio, Robert H. & Hatch, Brian & Jennings, Robert, 1997. "SOES Trading and Market Volatility," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 225-238, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Wai-Man & Sawyer, K. R., 2003. "How free are free trading options?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 573-591, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Automatic Execution; Bid-Ask Spread; Monitoring; SOES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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