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The Emergence of Government as Organized Violence-Cum-Robbery

Author

Listed:
  • Teulings, Coen
  • van Bavel, Bas
  • Van Besouw, Bram

Abstract

The protracted emergence of hierarchical government is most clearly epitomized in the shift from tribal societies to chiefdoms, the two archetypical forms of societal organization at either side of the emergence of hierarchy. To explain this shift, we present a model of individual production and violence between ex ante homogeneous players, and endogenous private monitoring. We show that coalition formation is essential for hierarchies to emerge and that power within coalitions depends on monopolizing information rather than violence capacities. Also, we highlight the limits of hierarchical chiefdoms competing against tribes and thus help explain why the shift was that protracted.

Suggested Citation

  • Teulings, Coen & van Bavel, Bas & Van Besouw, Bram, 2024. "The Emergence of Government as Organized Violence-Cum-Robbery," CEPR Discussion Papers 18974, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18974
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Neolithic revolution;

    JEL classification:

    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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