IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1873.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Headline Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Habib, Michel Antoine
  • Ljungqvist, Alexander P.

Abstract

We develop the implications of the observation that entrepreneurs can affect, to some extent at least, the level of underpricing in their firms’ Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by, for example, choosing highly reputable investment bankers as underwriters. We argue that entrepreneurs can, and will, minimize underpricing, but that they will do so only to an extent that is commensurate with the minimization of their wealth losses. Our empirical results suggest this is indeed the case in the United States: entrepreneurs will minimize underpricing until their marginal wealth losses equal the marginal cost of reducing headline underpricing. This suggests that private benefits may not be of primary importance when going public.

Suggested Citation

  • Habib, Michel Antoine & Ljungqvist, Alexander P., 1998. "Headline Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1873, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1873
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1873
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Franzke, Stefanie A. & Schlag, Christian, 2003. "Over-allotment options in IPOs on Germany's Neuer Markt: An empirical investigation," CFS Working Paper Series 2002/16, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    2. Benninga, Simon & Helmantel, Mark & Sarig, Oded, 2005. "The timing of initial public offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 115-132, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency Costs; Initial Public Offerings; Private Benefits of Control; Underpricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1873. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.