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Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms

Author

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  • Perez-Richet, Eduardo
  • Skreta, Vasiliki

Abstract

We study the optimal design of fraud-proof allocation mechanisms with- out transfers. An agent’s eligibility relies on a score reflecting social value, but gaming generates misallocations, mistrust, unfairness and other nega- tive externalities. We characterize optimal allocation rules that are immune to gaming under two classes of gaming technologies. We examine the im- pact of demographic changes on allocations within and across identifiable groups, while accounting for resource and quota constraints. Fraud-proof allocation rules enhance fairness and trust in allocation systems at the cost of some allocative efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2023. "Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 18466, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18466
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C82 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data; Data Access

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