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Strategic Quality Choice with Minimum Quality Standards

Author

Listed:
  • Lutz, Stefan
  • Lyon, Thomas P
  • Maxwell, John W

Abstract

In many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers choose to compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them. Such ‘high-quality’ strategies often win public acclaim, especially when ‘environmental friendliness’ is the dimension along which firms are differentiated. We analyse this phenomenon using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. A minimum quality standard leads both the high-quality and the low-quality firm to increase product qualities, lower prices, and increase quantities sold. As a result, total welfare increases. Industry profits fall, however, because reduced quality differentiation intensifies price competition. If the high-quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated, it induces the regulator to weaken its standards, and welfare falls.

Suggested Citation

  • Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "Strategic Quality Choice with Minimum Quality Standards," CEPR Discussion Papers 1793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1793
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sara Scatasta & Justus Wesseler & Jill Hobbs, 2007. "Differentiating the consumer benefits from labeling of GM food products," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(2‐3), pages 237-242, September.
    2. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth & Ingrid Nielsen & Chris Nyland & Cherrie Zhu, 2007. "Firm Compliance With Social Insurance Obligations Where There Is A Weak Surveillance And Enforcement Mechanism: Empirical Evidence From Shanghai," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(5), pages 577-596, December.
    3. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 1999. "Corporate environmental strategies as tools to influence regulation," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 189-196, May.
    4. Scatasta, Sara & Wesseler, Justus & Hobbs, Jill E., 2005. "The Impact of Labeling Practices on Perceived Quality of GM Food Products: A Revealed Preferences Approach," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24599, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Bonev, Petyo & Glachant, Matthieu & Söderberg, Magnus, 2020. "Testing the regulatory threat hypothesis: Evidence from Sweden," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. Eric W. Welch & Yasuhumi Mori & Midori Aoyagi‐Usui, 2002. "Voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 in Japan: mechanisms, stages and effects," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 43-62, January.
    7. Davies, Ronald B., 2005. "Abstinence from child labor and profit seeking," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 251-263, February.
    8. Bonev, Petyo & Glachant, Matthieu & Söderberg, Magnus, 2018. "A Mechanism for Institutionalised Threat of Regulation: Evidence from the Swedish District Heating Market," Economics Working Paper Series 1805, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    9. Eric W. Welch & Allan Mazur & Stuart Bretschneider, 2000. "Voluntary behavior by electric utilities: Levels of adoption and contribution of the climate challenge program to the reduction of carbon dioxide," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 407-425.
    10. Lander Beloqui & Jose M. Usategui, 2004. "Overcompliance with minimum quality standards," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(2), pages 233-255, May.
    11. Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Informal Benchmarks as a Source of Regulatory Threat in Unregulated Utility Sectors," CESifo Working Paper Series 2973, CESifo.
    12. Magnus Söderberg & Makoto Tanaka, 2012. "Spatial price homogeneity as a mechanism to reduce the threat of regulatory intervention in locally monopolistic sectors," Working Papers hal-00659458, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environment; Product Differentiation; Quality; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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