Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment
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Other versions of this item:
- Saint-Paul, G., 1996. "Voting for Jobs: Policy Persistence and Unemployment," DELTA Working Papers 96-02, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Citations
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Cited by:
- Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999.
"Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 266-291, April.
- Ramon Marimon & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1997. "Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits," Economics Working Papers 211, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Seminar Papers 661, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Ramon Marimon & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1997. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," NBER Working Papers 6038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1998.
"Equilibrium unemployment insurance,"
Economics Working Papers
605, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 1999.
- Hassler, John & Mora, José & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance," Seminar Papers 665, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Hassler, J. & Mora, J.V.R. & Storesletten, K. & Zilibotti, F., 1999. "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance," Papers 665, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anil Duman, 2010. "Risks in the labor market and social insurance preferences: Germany and the USA," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 150-164, January.
More about this item
Keywords
Fiscal Policy; Job Creation; Political Economy; Public Spending; Unemployment; Voting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
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