IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/101.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Privatisation of British Gas and the Possible Consequences for the European Gas Market

Author

Listed:
  • Newbery, David M G

Abstract

The British Government plans to privatise the British Gas Corporation in the autumn of 1986. The paper attempts to predict the possible consequences for the European gas market of privatisation, and their consequent implications for the United Kingdom. Much will depend on whether the Government relinquishes its control over trade in gas, and in particular allows the construction of a pipeline link to the European gas grid. We examine possible reasons why the Government has opposed the construction of a link in the past. These include the argument that it represents an attempt to exercise market power in the European gas market whilst avoiding the problem of dynamic inconsistency which trade taxes would encounter. None of the arguments are convincing on social welfare grounds, though they can be explained as an attempt by the BGC to increase its bargaining power vis-a-vis the oil companies. Given the current system of gas taxation this power is no longer desirable, whilst changes in the European gas market make a link attractive to the United Kingdom. We conclude that as a matter of urgency the Government should reconsider its attitude to gas trade and remove the obstacles to the construction of a link before privatisation takes place. Possible benefits include encouraging Norway to exploit Troll and sell it to Europe via Britain, allowing a more efficient depletion policy for United Kingdom gas fields, gaining access to peak shaving gas from Groningen, and increasing the degree of competition and the flexibility of the European gas market.

Suggested Citation

  • Newbery, David M G, 1986. "The Privatisation of British Gas and the Possible Consequences for the European Gas Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 101, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:101
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=101
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.