Jointly optimal taxes and enforcement policies in response to tax evasion
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00169.x
Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 6(2), 337-374, 2004
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Cited by:
- Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009.
"Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 897-926, December.
- Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Martin Besfamille & Pablo Olmos, 2010. "Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IUE-2013-09-24 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2013-09-24 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-09-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2013-09-24 (Public Finance)
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