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Redistribution with unobservable bequests: a case for taxing capital income

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  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics, ability and inheritance. We assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously, whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non‐linear. In such a setting, we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non‐linear tax on labour income is desirable. The role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth. JEL Classification D63, H2
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2000. "Redistribution with unobservable bequests: a case for taxing capital income," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1457, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1457
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00198
    Note: In : Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(2), 253-267, 2000
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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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