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Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining

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  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.

Abstract

This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.
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Suggested Citation

  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1999. "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1421, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1421
    DOI: 10.1007/s001990050298
    Note: In : Economic Theory, 14, 353-371, 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. Herings, P.J.J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V., 2000. "Social rationalizability," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Bargaining with an Endogenous Deadline," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1996011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    3. Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
    4. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 440-461, June.
    5. Roberto Serrano & Sandeep Baliga, 2001. "Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7.
    6. Bedayo, Mikel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Bargaining in endogenous trading networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 70-82.
    7. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    8. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December.
    9. Kool, C.J.M. & Thornton, D., 2000. "The expectations theory and the founding of the fed: another look at the evidence," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    10. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "An n-person Rubinstein bargaining game," Working Papers 2005:39, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    11. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2004. "Bargaining with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 321-335, July.
    12. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo & Chen Qu, 2016. "Rationalizability in general situations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 147-167, January.
    13. Goossens, J.H.M. & van Hoesel, C.P.M. & Kroon, L.G., 2002. "On solving multi-type line planning problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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