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A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies

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  • FORGES, F.

Abstract

A mechanism is posterior efficient in a differential information economy if at every outcome selected by the mechanism, the agents' expected utilities given this outcome cannot be Pareto improved by any feasible mechanism (in the revised economy). We show that a non-revealing (resp. completely revealing) mechanism is posterior efficient if and only if it is incentive interim efficient (resp. ex post efficient). The various efficiency concepts are illustrated in a simple adverse selection model.
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Suggested Citation

  • Forges, F., 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1111, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1111
    DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(94)90073-6
    Note: In : Economics Letters, 46, 27-31, 1994
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    Cited by:

    1. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
    2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
    4. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.

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