IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/2017030.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Screening procrastinators with automatiic-renewal contracts

Author

Listed:
  • JOHNEN Johannes

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain)

Abstract

Automatic contract renewals are a common feature in consumer markets and a frequent concern among policy makers. They can be used to exploit consumer inertia when consumers forgo benefits from switching to better alternatives. I consider two sources for th

Suggested Citation

  • JOHNEN Johannes, 2017. "Screening procrastinators with automatiic-renewal contracts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2017030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2017030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2017.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Murooka, Takeshi & Schwarz, Marco A., 2019. "Consumer exploitation and notice periods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 89-92.
    2. Murooka, Takeshi & Schwarz, Marco A., 2018. "The timing of choice-enhancing policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 27-40.
    3. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Limited Attention; Automatic Contract Renewal; Price Discrimination; Present Bias; Naiveté;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2017030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.