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Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems

Author

Listed:
  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • CREMER, Jacques

    (CNRS, GREMAQ and DEI, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)

  • GERARD-VARET, Louis-André

    (GREMAQ, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Marseille)

Abstract

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auctions and public goods problems with semi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents

Suggested Citation

  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998. "Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998010
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1998.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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