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Trials and Errors : PLEA Bargaining as a Learning Device

Author

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  • BORTOLOTTI, Bernardo

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomplete information game. It is shown that, for a given parameter configuration, there exists a Bayesian equilibrium with perfect screening of the guilty defendant. In the repeated game, a prosecutor who systematically resorts to the informative strategy and updates her beliefs in a Bayesian fashion asymptotically learns the "truth" in terms of proportion of guilty parties in the whole population of the indictees.

Suggested Citation

  • BORTOLOTTI, Bernardo, 1996. "Trials and Errors : PLEA Bargaining as a Learning Device," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996049
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1996.html
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Plea Bargain; Litigation; Bayesian Learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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