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A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form

Author

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  • RAY, Indrajit

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

If a solution (on a closed [exp.2] family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independence of irrelevant strategies (lIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor lIS as shown in two simple examples, using coalition- proof Nash equilibrium. However, CONS implies weak dummy axiom (WDUM) which can replace DUM in the above proposition.

Suggested Citation

  • RAY, Indrajit, 1996. "A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996017
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1996.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for the theory of equilibrium refinements," Other publications TiSEM 83089980-4aeb-43b5-9c57-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for the theory of equilibrium refinements," Other publications TiSEM 83089980-4aeb-43b5-9c57-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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