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Nash-Walras equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • GHOSAL, Sayantan

    (Department of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of)

  • POLEMARCHAKIS , Heracles

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained Pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a Pareto improvement in welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • GHOSAL, Sayantan & POLEMARCHAKIS , Heracles, 1995. "Nash-Walras equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1995080, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995080
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1995.html
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Carvajal, 2003. "Testable Restrictions og General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," Borradores de Economia 3556, Banco de la Republica.
    2. Marc Fleurbaey & Ravi Kanbur & Dennis Snower & Dennis J. Snower, 2021. "Efficiency and Equity in a Society-Economy Integrated Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 9259, CESifo.
    3. MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1999. "Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games and Household Consumption," MPRA Paper 6818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Arvaniti, Maria & Carvajal, Andrés, 2018. "Risk externalities: When financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 87-100.
    6. Deb, Rahul, 2009. "A testable model of consumption with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1804-1816, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash; Walras; equilibrium; determinacy; optimality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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