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Stackelberg vs. Cournot / Bertrand Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • AMIR, Rabah

    (Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, FRG)

  • GRILO, Isabel

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider the issue of endogenous timing, according to the extended game of Hamilton-Sluytsky (1990), for the classical Coumot and Bertrand duopolies. We provide minimal sufficient conditions, directly on the primitives of each model (i.e. the demand and cost functions), yielding the simultaneous and two sequential modes of play. No superfluous assumptions of concavity, existence and uniqueness of equilibria... are needed, and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games.

Suggested Citation

  • AMIR, Rabah & GRILO, Isabel, 1994. "Stackelberg vs. Cournot / Bertrand Equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994024
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1994.html
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    Cited by:

    1. José J. Sempere Monerris & Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz, 1998. "- Duopoly Price Communication," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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