IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/1992036.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentive schemes as strategic variables: an application to a mixed duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • BARROS, Fatima

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

In a context of asymmetry of information between firms' owners and their managers, we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in an oligopoly industry. Moreover, we consider that the government has the possibilityto intervene in the market by nationalizing an incumbent firm. In such framework a public firm can be used as an internal regulation mechanism . At the same time owners can use intrafirm contracting in a strategic way, taking advantage of the interaction among players. We conclude that government might have advantage in introducing a public firm in the market and if he does both firms' owners will always choose strategic contracts for their managers. Further, if firms decide on contracts sequentially we show that a private and a public firm would agree on the attribution of the leader role to the public firm.

Suggested Citation

  • BARROS, Fatima, 1992. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: an application to a mixed duopoly," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1992036
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1992.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lorenz NETT, 1993. "Mixed Oligopoly With Homogeneous Goods," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 367-393, July.
    2. Senbongi, Shuichi & Harrington, Joseph E., 1995. "Managerial reputation and the competitiveness of an industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 95-110, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed oligopoly; Strategic contracts; Asymmetry of information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1992036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.