The colombian budget process
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References listed on IDEAS
- Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999.
"Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,"
NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36,
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," Documentos CEDE 2944, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9091, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Olivera, Mauricio & Pachón, Mónica & Perry, Guillermo, 2010. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform: The Case of Colombia, 1986-2006," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1718, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Alejandro Hoyos & Hugo Nopo, 2010.
"Evolution of Gender Gaps in Latin America at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: An Addendum to "New Century, Old Disparities","
Research Department Publications
4665, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Hoyos, Alejandro & Ñopo, Hugo R., 2010. "Evolution of Gender Gaps in Latin America at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: An Addendum to "New Century, Old Disparities"," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1803, Inter-American Development Bank.
- World Bank, 2005. "Colombia : Public Expenditure Review," World Bank Publications - Reports 8559, The World Bank Group.
- Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales Y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Los Casos De Argentina, Colombia, México Y Perú," Documentos CEDE 3475, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Echeverry, Juan Carlos & Bonilla, Jorge Alexander & Moya, Andrés, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2303, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Mauricio Olivera & Monica Pachon & Guillermo Perry, 2010. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform: The Case of Colombia, 1986-2006," Research Department Publications 4674, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Isidro Hernández Rodríguez, 2001. "El proceso presupuestal colombiano: comentarios a la propuesta de la Misión Alesina," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 228-245, July-Dece.
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More about this item
Keywords
Presupuesto; Presupuesto Nacional; Política Fiscal; Finanzas Públicas; Descentralización; Colombia;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
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