IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/015896.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Politics and reconciliation: A critical juncture for state building

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Eslava
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • Andrés Moya

Abstract

We describe some features of the political environment in Colombia, drawing from a unique panel dataset of about 10,000 households. Contrasting responses in 2013 and 2016, we document a persistent lack of interest in politics and prevailing clientelism, with personalistic links dominating partisan affinity. Engagement in clientelistic vote buying, instead, is quite variable in time, with households getting into and out of these exchanges. Rejecting the simplest and more optimistic theories of modernization, we do not find that increases in household wealth correlate with the abandonment of clientelism. Instead, changes in the weakness of the state (as proxied with tax evasion) correlate strongly with changes in clientelism. Strengthening the state therefore seems a priority. Viewing peace-building efforts as one key step in this direction naturally leads to the examination of the attitudes towards the recent peace process between the government and the Farc, Colombia's largest guerrilla group. With a special set of questions included in 2016, we also study households' perspectives on this topic. The data reveals a rare combination of indifference and polarization towards the peace process. A large share of people feel the peace process implies no substantial changes for their lives, and those that do are approximately equally divided between those expecting positive and negative changes. Those who live in areas in which non-state armed groups were present are relatively less indifferent, yet they are not simply more pessimistic or optimistic. Most respondents report no discomfort with having former rebels as neighbors or employees, but they do reject political participation and financing benefits for rebels (two key aspects of the peace treaty) comparatively more.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Eslava & Leopoldo Fergusson & Andrés Moya, 2017. "Politics and reconciliation: A critical juncture for state building," Documentos CEDE 15896, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:015896
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/6415/dcede2017-69.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ximena Cadena, 2014. "Colombia en Movimiento 2010-2013," Libros en Línea 14162, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 69-105, March.
    3. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    4. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2018. "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2018), pages 181-218, November.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos A. Molina & James A. Robinson, 2022. "The Weak State Trap," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 293-331, April.
    2. Francisco Eslava & Leopoldo Fergusson & Andrés Moya, 2017. "Política y Reconciliación: Una coyuntura crítica para la construcción de Estado," Documentos CEDE 15895, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Leopoldo Fergusson, 2019. "Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, vol. 38(78), pages 671-700, November.
    4. Davin Chor & Filipe R. Campante, 2008. "Schooling and Political Participation Revisited," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22072, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    5. Stephen L. Parente & Luis Felipe Sáenz & Anna Seim, 2022. "Income, education and democracy," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 193-233, June.
    6. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    7. Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2012. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1221, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2018. "I Sell My Vote, and So What? Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates of Clientelism in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2018), pages 181-218, November.
    9. Leopoldo Fergusson & Horacio Larreguy & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2022. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2815-2834.
    10. Adam, Antonis & Delis, Manthos D. & Kammas, Pantelis, 2011. "Are democratic governments more efficient?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 75-86, March.
    11. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    12. Thorsten Janus, 2023. "Technology adoption in autocratic economies: The role of fiscal capacity," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 70(4), pages 355-371, September.
    13. Faisal Z. Ahmed, 2017. "Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 22-47, March.
    14. Willa Friedman & Michael Kremer & Edward Miguel & Rebecca Thornton, 2016. "Education as Liberation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 1-30, January.
    15. Campante, Filipe R. & Chor, Davin, 2008. "Schooling and Political Participation in a Neoclassical Framework: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series rwp08-043, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    16. Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2024. "Culture, institutions and the long divergence," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-40, March.
    17. Daron Acemoglu & Francisco A. Gallego & James A. Robinson, 2014. "Institutions, Human Capital, and Development ," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 875-912, August.
    18. Gallego, Jorge & Guardado, Jenny & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Do gifts buy votes? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    19. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2014. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 322-346, June.
    20. Leopoldo Fergusson & Arturo Harker & Carlos Molina & Juan Camilo Yamín, 2023. "Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students," Documentos CEDE 20732, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Clientelism; tax evasion; conflict; state.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000089:015896. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.