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Entender y combatir el crimen: modelo de comportamiento criminal basado en la provisión de información

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolás Rodríguez Sanabria
  • Andrés Zambrano

Abstract

Las ciudades de Colombia mantienen índices altos de delito a pesar del aumento del gasto en defensa y seguridad. Este trabajo propone y analiza la provisión de información como una estrategia de bajo costo que puede ser efectiva para la disuasión del crimen. Para mostrar su efectividad, desarrollamos un juego dinámico con información imperfecta entre Autoridad y Criminal. En este juego la Autoridad debe decidir si asignar o no un policía a un área determinada y si enviar o no una senal. Por su lado, el Criminal solo observa la senal y debe decidir si comete el crimen o no. Si decide cometerlo será atrapado únicamente si un policía está presente. Uno de los equilibrios muestra que el uso adecuado de la senal puede desincentivar el crimen a través de una mayor percepción de captura sin incurrir en altos costos como el incremento del pie de fuerza.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolás Rodríguez Sanabria & Andrés Zambrano, 2017. "Entender y combatir el crimen: modelo de comportamiento criminal basado en la provisión de información," Documentos CEDE 15432, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:015432
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    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8685/dcede2017-18.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    delincuencia; comportamiento Criminal; orden público; información asimétrica.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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