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Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation

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  • César Andrés Mantilla

Abstract

This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner´s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • César Andrés Mantilla, 2012. "Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation," Documentos CEDE 9386, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:009386
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    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8299/dcede2012-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner's Dilemma - Payoff Inequality - Evolutionary Game Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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