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¿Cuándo votan los pobres? Partidos, maquinarias y cambios constitucionales en el siglo XIX en Colombia

Author

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  • Miguel Alonso Sarzosa

Abstract

En Colombia la democracia ha sido el mecanismo normal para acceder al poder. Sin embargo, desde los albores de la república los enfrentamientos bélicos partidistas y los cambios constitucionales fueron una constante. Este trabajo muestra cómo en el siglo XIX en Colombia, los cambios constitucionales estaban íntimamente relacionados con la popularidad del partido que gobernaba. A través de cambios constitucionales y utilizando el voto censitario económico, dicho partido buscaba seleccionar la masa votante con la que maximizaría su probabilidad de ganar las siguientes elecciones. El trabajo demuestra la existencia histórica del fenómeno, proponiéndolo como un mecanismo de manipulación electoral diferente al clientelismo o el populismo, y luego desarrolla un modelo teórico, a partir del modelo de votación probabilística, que muestra los incentivos que tenían los políticos para cambiar las constituciones.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Alonso Sarzosa, 2008. "¿Cuándo votan los pobres? Partidos, maquinarias y cambios constitucionales en el siglo XIX en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 4714, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:004714
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    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8055/dcede2008-05.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voto censitario económico; cambios constituciones; votación probabilística; elecciones en el siglo XIX;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Y - Miscellaneous Categories
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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