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A Dynamic Theory of Deterrence and Compliance

Author

Listed:
  • C Bekar
  • K Carlaw

Abstract

Bentham understood the deterrence of antisocial behavior to be a dynamic process. The widely observed positive autocorrelation in time series of violations suggest he was correct. Yet there are no fully dynamic models of deterrence. Following Bentham, we assume that subjective probabilities of apprehension are determined by the recent history of violations and apprehensions and that the objective probability of appre- hension is increasing in the quantity of enforcement resources and decreasing in the number of violations. These assumptions imply that deterrence is a dynamic stochastic process, that the time series of violations exhibits positive autocorrelation, and that there can be disruptive positive feedback that generates waves of high and low crime. We nd that managing positive feedback is the essential policy problem. Our dynamic framework uni es aspects of research on the optimal quantity of enforcement resources and pro-active policing strategies like crackdowns and hot-spot policing.

Suggested Citation

  • C Bekar & K Carlaw, "undated". "A Dynamic Theory of Deterrence and Compliance," Working Papers 2022-06, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 12 Sep 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:2022-06
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deterrence; Perceptual Deterrence; Crime; Dynamics of Crime; Regulation; Markov Chains; Crime Waves; Proactive Policing; Crackdo;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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