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Participation, Markets and Democracy

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  • Deepak Lal

    (UCLA)

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  • Deepak Lal, 1993. "Participation, Markets and Democracy," UCLA Economics Working Papers 705, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:705
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp705.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aftalion,Florin, 1990. "The French Revolution," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521368100, September.
    2. Gourevitch, Peter A., 1993. "Democracy and economic policy: Elective affinities and circumstantial conjunctures," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1271-1280, August.
    3. Finsterbusch, Kurt & Van Wicklin, Warren A, III, 1989. "Beneficiary Participation in Development Projects: Empirical Tests of Popular Theories," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 573-593, April.
    4. Salmen, Lawrence F. & Eaves, A. Paige, 1989. "World Bank work with nongovernmental organizations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 305, The World Bank.
    5. Drabek, Anne Gordon, 1987. "Development alternatives: The challenge for NGOs--an overview of the issues," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 15(1, Supple), pages 1-1.
    6. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
    7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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