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Communication and Monetary Policy

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Listed:
  • Jeffery Amato
  • Stephen Morris
  • Hyun Song Shin

Abstract

Recent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasize the importance of communication policy. In this paper, we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public information serves the dual role of conveying fundamental information as well as serving as a focal point for better coordination. More precise public information is a double-edged tool. While it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination, sometimes it can be too effective, and coordinate actions away from fundamentals. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jeffery Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000330, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000330
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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