IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cii/cepidt/2015-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

From the Investment Plan to the Capital Markets Union: European Financial Structure and Cross Border Risk-sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Jesper Berg
  • Laurent Clerc
  • Olivier Garnier
  • Erik Nielsen
  • Natacha Valla

Abstract

Following the financial crisis, Europe is suffering from a significant investment deficit. It has long been appreciated that growth will suffer in Europe over the medium term unless the shortfall in investment is addressed, but considerable disagreement on how to achieve this, and in particular on the role public investment should play. In addition, mobilising finance to increase investment in Europe requires both a good understanding of Europe’s financial structure, and a fine knowledge of the composition of cross-border financial imbalances. In this paper, we take stock of the state of play regarding investment, financial structures and cross-border imbalances. We contend that any initiative meant to provide a sound basis for long-term, stable investment flows has to acknowledge the fact that Europe is engaged in a debt-deflation deleveraging phase, with accompanying disintermediation, the full extent of which is as yet unknown. We then draw policy conclusions that would allow for a sustainable investment revival, insisting on the need to have an overall strategic vision for the main EU policy initiatives - the Investment Plan, the Capital Markets Union, and the €1,100bn new money issued by the ECB within its Large Asset Purchase Programme.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesper Berg & Laurent Clerc & Olivier Garnier & Erik Nielsen & Natacha Valla, 2015. "From the Investment Plan to the Capital Markets Union: European Financial Structure and Cross Border Risk-sharing," Working Papers 2015-34, CEPII research center.
    • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:2015-34
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/wp/2015/wp2015-34.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierfederico Asdrubali & Bent E. Sørensen & Oved Yosha, 1996. "Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 1081-1110.
    2. Jesper Berg & Christian Sinding Bentzen, 2014. "Mirror, Mirror, who is the Fairest of Them All? Reflections on the Design of and Risk Distribution in the Mortgage Systems of Denmark and The UK," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 230(1), pages 58-75, November.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    4. Ralf Hepp & Jürgen von Hagen, 2013. "Interstate risk sharing in Germany: 1970--2006," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-24, January.
    5. Miguel A. Segoviano & Bradley Jones & Peter Lindner & Johannes Blankenheim, 2015. "Securitization: The Road Ahead," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2015/001, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Ferdinand Fichtner & Marcel Fratzscher & Martin Gornig, 2014. "An Investment Agenda for Europe," DIW Economic Bulletin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 4(7), pages 3-6.
    7. Natacha Valla & Thomas Brand & Sébastien Doisy, 2014. "A New Architecture for Public Investment in Europe," CEPII Policy Brief 2014-04, CEPII research center.
    8. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Natacha Valla & Jesper Berg & Laurent Clerc & Olivier Garnier & Erik Nielsen, 2015. "A holistic approach to ECB asset purchases, the Investment Plan and CMU," CEPII Policy Brief 2015-07, CEPII research center.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bofinger, Peter & Schnabel, Isabel & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2015. "Zukunftsfähigkeit in den Mittelpunkt. Jahresgutachten 2015/16 [Focus on Future Viability. Annual Report 2015/16]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201516.
    2. Fidrmuc, Jarko & Lind, Ronja, 2020. "Macroeconomic impact of Basel III: Evidence from a meta-analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Cima, Simone & Cimadomo, Jacopo, 2018. "A minimal moral hazard central stabilisation capacity for the EMU based on world trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 12600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Fidrmuc, Jan, 2015. "Political economy of fiscal unions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 147-157.
    5. Cimadomo, Jacopo & Ciminelli, Gabriele & Furtuna, Oana & Giuliodori, Massimo, 2020. "Private and public risk sharing in the euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. Fidrmuc, Jarko & Foster, Neil & Scharler, Johann, 2011. "Labour market rigidities and international risk sharing across OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 660-677, June.
    7. Hebous, Shafik & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2015. "Towards a fiscal union? On the acceptability of a fiscal transfer system in the eurozone," SAFE White Paper Series 28, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    8. Belke, Ansgar & Gros, Daniel, 2015. "Banking Union as a Shock Absorber," Ruhr Economic Papers 548, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2004:i:23:p:1-13 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Fratzscher, Marcel & Imbs, Jean, 2009. "Risk sharing, finance, and institutions in international portfolios," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 428-447, December.
    11. Verstegen, Loes & Meijdam, Lex, 2016. "The Effectiveness of a Fiscal Transfer Mechanism in a Monetary Union : A DSGE Model for the Euro Area," Discussion Paper 2016-023, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Plamen Nikolov & Paolo Pasimeni, 2023. "Fiscal Stabilization in the United States: Lessons for Monetary Unions," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 113-153, February.
    13. Bofinger, Peter & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Schnabel, Isabel & Wieland, Volker, 2018. "Vor wichtigen wirtschaftspolitischen Weichenstellungen. Jahresgutachten 2018/19 [Setting the Right Course for Economic Policy. Annual Report 2018/19]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201819.
    14. Lannoo, Karel & Thomadakis, Apostolos, 2019. "Rebranding Capital Markets Union: A market finance action plan," ECMI Papers 500, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    15. Parsley, David & Popper, Helen, 2019. "GDP Synchronicity and Risk Sharing Channels in a Monetary Union: Blue State and Red States," MPRA Paper 98981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Jeongseok Song & Doojin Ryu, 2018. "Aging effects on consumption risk-sharing channels in European countries," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business, vol. 36(2), pages 585-617.
    17. Atanas Pekanov, 2019. "Policy Brief: Past and Present of EMU Reform. Reforming the Euro Area – The Road Not (Yet) Taken," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61850.
    18. Martinez, Joseba & Philippon, Thomas & Sihvonen, Markus, 2022. "Does a currency union need a capital market union?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    19. Dashkeev, Vladimir V & Turnovsky, Stephen J, 2018. "Balanced-budget rules and risk-sharing in a fiscal union," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 277-298.
    20. Ansgar Belke & Daniel Gros, 2016. "On the Shock-Absorbing Properties of a Banking Union: Europe Compared with the United States," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 58(3), pages 359-386, September.
    21. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem & Sorensen, Bent E. & Yosha, Oved, 2001. "Economic integration, industrial specialization, and the asymmetry of macroeconomic fluctuations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 107-137, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ECB; Capital Markets Union; Policy Srategy; Securitization; Covered Bonds; Financial Structure; Quantitative Easing; Cross-border Capital Flows;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:2015-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepiifr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.