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Moral Content Diminishes Preference Falsification

Author

Listed:
  • Maxine Bonneau

    (Imperial College London)

  • Tanya O'Garra

    (Imperial College London)

  • Praveen Kujal

    (Middlesex University Business School and Chapman University)

Abstract

We examine how the moral (or neutral) content of an issue influences the tendency to falsify attitudes, given varying social and monetary incentives to engage in such ‘preference falsification’. We conduct an incentivized two stage online experimental study where, in a prior first stage, attitude strength over moral and neutral issues is elicited. Then, in the second stage participants in groups of ten were asked to express their preferences regarding the moral or neutral issues for each possible combination of supporters and opposers in their group, each associated with varying monetary payoffs. More than half of the participants falsify their preferences between the two phases for both moral and neutral frames. The rate is significantly lower for the moral (vs neutral) issues. Participants’ average monetary cost to avoid falsifying preferences is higher in moral treatments, and increases with the level of attitude strength.

Suggested Citation

  • Maxine Bonneau & Tanya O'Garra & Praveen Kujal, 2024. "Moral Content Diminishes Preference Falsification," Working Papers 24-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:24-11
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/407/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Morality; preference falsification; incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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