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Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions

Author

Listed:
  • James Gilmore

    (Chapman University)

  • David Porter

    (Chapman University)

Abstract

One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.

Suggested Citation

  • James Gilmore & David Porter, 2023. "Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions," Working Papers 23-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-10
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/390/
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Stability; Flexible Quotas;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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