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Motives for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Schneider

    (Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama)

  • Timothy Shields

    (Argyros School of Business and Management, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

Abstract

We investigate the motives for cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that cooperation rates in one-shot PD games can be ranked empirically by the social surplus from cooperation. That study employs symmetric payoffs from cooperation in simultaneous PD games. Hence, in that setting, it is not possible to discern the motives for cooperation since three prominent social welfare criteria, social surplus (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin preferences, and inequity aversion make the same predictions. In the present paper, we conduct an experiment to identify which of these social preferences best explains differences in cooperation rates and to study the effects of the risk of non-cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Schneider & Timothy Shields, 2022. "Motives for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma," Working Papers 22-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:22-07
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/368/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Inequity aversion; Social surplus; Social preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

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