Risk and Reciprocity: Field Experiments in Siberia

Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and 3 participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic 4 environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted 5 with subsistence resource users in rural villages in remote Kamchatka Russia, we find evidence 6 consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When 7 experiments allow participants to develop reputations, as is the case in most small-scale societies, 8 we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good 9 reputations increase aid, and risk-pooling becomes more effective. Our results highlight the 10 importance of investigating social and ecological factors, beyond strategic risk, that affect the 11 balance between independence and interdependence when developing and testing theories of 12 cooperation.