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Tightening Tensions: Fiscal Policy and Civil Unrest in Eleven South American Countries, 1937 - 1995

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  • Joachim Voth

Abstract

Efforts at fiscal consolidation are often limited because of concerns over potential social unrest. From German austerity measures during the 1930s to the violent demonstrations in Greece in 2010, hard times have tended to go hand in hand with antigovernment violence. In this paper, I assemble cross-country evidence from eleven South American countries for the period 1937 to 1995 about the extent to which societies become unstable after budget cuts. The results show a clear positive correlation between austerity and instability. I examine the extent to which this relationship simply captures the fact that fiscal retrenchment and economic slumps are correlated, and conclude that this is not what is driving the effect. Finally, I test for interactions with various economic and political variables. While autocracies and democracies show a broadly similar response to budget cuts, countries with a history of stable institutions are less likely to see unrest as a result of austerity measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Voth, 2011. "Tightening Tensions: Fiscal Policy and Civil Unrest in Eleven South American Countries, 1937 - 1995," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 612, Central Bank of Chile.
  • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:612
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ryszard Piasecki & Erico Wulf B, 2014. "Fiscal Policy Rules: Evidence From Chilean Economy," Review of Business and Finance Studies, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 5(2), pages 45-54.
    4. Phoebe W. Ishak & Ulrich Fritsche, 2019. "Oil Price Shocks and Protest: Can Shadow Economy Mitigate?," Macroeconomics and Finance Series 201901, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    5. Francesco Passarelli & Guido Tabellini, 2017. "Emotions and Political Unrest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(3), pages 903-946.
    6. Patricia Justino & Bruno Martorano, 2016. "Inequality, Distributive Beliefs and Protests: A Recent Story from Latin America," HiCN Working Papers 218, Households in Conflict Network.
    7. De Luca, Giacomo Davide & Lin, Xi, 2024. "The role of health and health systems in promoting social capital, political participation and peace: A narrative review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    8. Patricia Justino & Bruno Martorano, 2017. "Welfare Spending and Political Conflict," HiCN Working Papers 256, Households in Conflict Network.
    9. Luis Rene Caceres, 2019. "Determinants of trust in government in Latin America," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 14(3), pages 329-351, Julio - S.

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