IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/chb/bcchwp/207.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

El Embriague Financiero: Una Visión Alternativa de Amplificación Bancaria

Author

Listed:
  • Elías Albagli

Abstract

This paper develops a model that explains the amplification of negative shocks faced by an economy through its banking system, but with a different grip as the standard financial accelerator theory. When a bank faces insolvency, it has incentives to continue sub-optimal projects in its portfolio, retarding or clutching the necessary process of creative destruction, which leads to sluggish economic performance. Considering three sectors, asymmetric information and agency problems, it is shown how the original magnitude of a generalized adverse shock can be amplified by the banking sector. The motivation of this study is provided by the current symptoms of the Japanese banking sector and the Chilean experience of the early 80´s debt crisis. These episodes show clear signals that validate the mechanisms identified by the theory, and suggest some measures to face crisis periods on a proper manner.

Suggested Citation

  • Elías Albagli, 2003. "El Embriague Financiero: Una Visión Alternativa de Amplificación Bancaria," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 207, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:207
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133326/DTBC_207.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yehning Chen, 1999. "Banking Panics: The Role of the First-Come, First-Served Rule and Information Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 946-968, October.
    2. Mr. Edward J Frydl & Mr. Marc G Quintyn, 2000. "The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 2000/147, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Anil K. Kashyap, 2002. "Sorting out Japan's financial crisis," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 26(Q IV), pages 42-55.
    4. Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Optimal Financial Instruments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(5), pages 1645-1663, December.
    5. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," CID Working Papers 21, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    6. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 2000/092, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eric Santor, 2003. "Banking Crises and Contagion: Empirical Evidence," Staff Working Papers 03-1, Bank of Canada.
    2. Julien Reynaud & Rofikoh Rokhim, 2005. "Do banking crises enhance efficiency? A case study of 1994 Turkish and 1997 Indonesian crises," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla05007, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    3. Raphael Solomon, 2005. "Pocket Banks and Out-of-Pocket Losses: Links between Corruption and Contagion," Staff Working Papers 05-23, Bank of Canada.
    4. Caramazza, Francesco & Ricci, Luca & Salgado, Ranil, 2004. "International financial contagion in currency crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 51-70, February.
    5. Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei, 2003. "Collateral value and forbearance lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20004, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Eric Santor, 2003. "Crisis bancarias y contagio: evidencia empírica," Monetaria, CEMLA, vol. 0(3), pages 293-344, julio-sep.
    7. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    8. Michiel Bijlsma & Wim Suyker, 2008. "The credit crisis and the Dutch economy... in eight frequently asked questions," CPB Memorandum 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    9. Michiel Bijlsma & Jeroen Klomp & Sijmen Duineveld, 2010. "Systemic risk in the financial sector; a review and synthesis," CPB Document 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    10. Pistor Katharina, 2012. "Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons from the Vienna Initiative," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-25, January.
    11. Coudert, Virginie & Gex, Mathieu, 2010. "Contagion inside the credit default swaps market: The case of the GM and Ford crisis in 2005," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 109-134, April.
    12. Raphael Solomon, 2004. "When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises," Staff Working Papers 04-18, Bank of Canada.
    13. Goodhart, Charles A.E. & Huang, Haizhou, 2005. "The lender of last resort," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1059-1082, May.
    14. Katharina PISTOR, 2000. "The Standardization Of Law And Its Effect On Developing Economies," G-24 Discussion Papers 4, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    15. Kox, Henk L.M. & Leeuwen, George van, 2012. "Dynamic market selection in EU business services," MPRA Paper 41016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Sander Oosterloo & Jakob de Haan, 2003. "A Survey of Institutional Frameworks for Financial Stability," DNB Occasional Studies 104, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    17. Fulghieri, Paolo & Lukin, Dmitry, 2001. "Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-42, July.
    18. Armstrong, Christopher & Nicoletti, Allison & Zhou, Frank S., 2022. "Executive stock options and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 256-276.
    19. Ambrocio, Gene & Colak, Gonul & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2022. "Commitment or constraint? The effect of loan covenants on merger and acquisition activity," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    20. Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2006. "Bankruptcy law and financial structure: The impact of managerial incentives," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 333-345.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alvaro Castillo (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bccgvcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.