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Could the ECB Governing Council Avoid the Formation of Coalition?

Author

Listed:
  • Gilbert Bougi

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Audrey Buf

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Jean-Pierre Centi

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Armand Taranco

    (Aix-Marseille Université)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the possible coalition formation in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) over the period 2007-2011. In this way, we determine a priori monetary policy stance for each European members through the estimation of Taylor- type rule. Our results show that the ECB Governing Council is strongly heterogeneous with different monetary preferences. Discrepancies among committee members could lead to potential alliances in the Council. The formation of coalition, analyzed through a cluster analysis, reveals that it could be difficult for the Executive Board to impose European perspectives. The analysis of voting power emphasizes that the Executive board will lose its strategic position when national governors form coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert Bougi & Audrey Buf & Jean-Pierre Centi & Armand Taranco, 2012. "Could the ECB Governing Council Avoid the Formation of Coalition?," CAE Working Papers 99, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:99
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Monetary Union; Cluster analysis; Voting power; Decision-making process; Taylor rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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