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Mavericks, Universal, and Common Owners - The Largest Shareholders of U.S. Public Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Amir Amel-Zadeh
  • Fiona Kasperk
  • Martin C. Schmalz

Abstract

We construct a novel data set to show that, between 2003-2020, up to one-fifth of America’s largest firms had a non-financial blockholder or insider as their largest shareholder. Blockholders and insiders tend to be less diversified than institutional investors. Measures of “universal” and “common” ownership of firms are therefore lower than previously believed based on analyses of institutional investors’ holdings alone, and the heterogeneity in ownership structures across firms is greater. Consolidation in the asset management industry increases universal ownership and common ownership of industry rivals. Extant results claiming indexing alone explains the rise of universal ownership cannot be confirmed with the new, more comprehensive data.

Suggested Citation

  • Amir Amel-Zadeh & Fiona Kasperk & Martin C. Schmalz, 2022. "Mavericks, Universal, and Common Owners - The Largest Shareholders of U.S. Public Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 9926, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9926
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9926.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    common ownership; institutional ownership; blockholders; insiders; antitrust; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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