Are Women Less Effective Leaders Than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Heursen, Lea & Ranehill, Eva & Weber, Roberto A, 2020. "Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games," Working Papers in Economics 796, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Lea Heursen & Eva Ranehill & Roberto A. Weber, 2020. "Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games," ECON - Working Papers 368, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Lea Heursen & Eva Ranehill & Roberto Weber, 2023. "Are Women Less Effective Leaders than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 472, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Peter Haan & Lea Heursen & Jule Specht & Bruno Veltri & Georg Weizsäcker, 2023. "Public Appeals and Collective Crisis Mitigation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 478, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Roy, Moumita & Houser, Daniel, 2024. "Identity, Leadership, and Cooperation: An experimental analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
More about this item
Keywords
gender; coordination games; leadership; experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2021-01-04 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2021-01-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2021-01-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2021-01-04 (Labour Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8713. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.