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Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, “Coopetition” in a Bottom-up Federation

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  • Marcel Gérard

Abstract

This paper investigates replacing separate taxation by consolidation and formulary apportionment in a Bottom-up Federation, when a multijurisdictional firm is mobile in various respects. The reform is decided cooperatively by all the jurisdictions or by some of them, while tax rates remain within the competence of each jurisdiction. The paper sets forth the conditions for the reform to be social welfare enhancing, while not increasing tax competition. Among them, the formula should emphasize criteria that the Multijurisdictional Enterprise cannot easily manipulate and the consolidating area should protect its capacity to levy taxes by adopting a crediting system, possibly extended to accrued capital gains, vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Policy conclusions are suggested accordingly.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Gérard, 2006. "Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, “Coopetition” in a Bottom-up Federation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1860, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1860
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joann Weiner, 2002. "Formula Apportionment in the European Union: A Dream Come True or the EU’s Worst Nightmare?," CESifo Working Paper Series 667, CESifo.
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    5. Marcel Gérard & Joann Weiner, 2003. "Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary Apportionment: How do they affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and interjurisdictional tax competition ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1004, CESifo.
    6. Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., 2004. "The European Commission's Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(2), pages 199-220, March.
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    13. Marcel Gérard & Joann Martens Weiner, 2006. "Comment la compensation internationale des pertes et la répartition proportionnelle des revenus imposables peuvent affecter les choix des multinationales et la concurrence fiscale," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 65-77.
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    18. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2008. "Why the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment with a Sales Factor," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(3), pages 567-589, September.
    19. Marcel Gérard, 2005. "Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under Alternative Tax Designs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1527, CESifo.
    20. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wildasin, David E., 2007. "Pre–Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 60(3), pages 649-662, September.
    2. Marcel Gérard, 2006. "Reforming the taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises in Europe: a tentative appraisal," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 265, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    3. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    4. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    5. Marcel Gérard & Savina Princen, 2012. "Investment and Financing Strategy of a Multinational Enterprise under Alternative Tax Designs," CESifo Working Paper Series 3838, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation of multinational enterprises; consolidation and formulary apportionment; fiscal federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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