Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
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- Bo Cowgill & Patryk Perkowski, 2024. "Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 852-882.
- Cowgill, Bo & Perkowski, Patryk, 2024. "Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit," IZA Discussion Papers 17004, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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More about this item
Keywords
hiring; recruiting; discrimination; field experiments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ACC-2024-07-08 (Accounting and Auditing)
- NEP-EXP-2024-07-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2024-07-08 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages)
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