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Making a Motivated Manager: A Census Data Investigation into Efficiency Differences Between Franchisee and Franchisor-Owned Restaurants

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  • Matthew Sveum
  • Michael Sykuta

Abstract

While there has been significant research on the reasons for franchising, little work has examined the effects of franchising on establishment performance. This paper attempts to fill that gap. We use restricted-access US Census Bureau microdata from the 2007 Census of Retail Trade to examine establishment-level productivity of franchisee- and franchisor-owned restaurants. We do this by employing a two-stage data envelopment analysis model where the first stage uses DEA to measure each establishment’s efficiency. The DEA efficiency score is then used as the second-stage dependent variable. The results show a strong and robust effect attributed to franchisee ownership for full service restaurants, but a smaller and insignificant difference for limited service restaurants. We believe the differences in task programability between limited and full service restaurants results in a very different role for managers/franchisees and is the driving factor behind the different results.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Sveum & Michael Sykuta, 2016. "Making a Motivated Manager: A Census Data Investigation into Efficiency Differences Between Franchisee and Franchisor-Owned Restaurants," Working Papers 16-54, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    • Handle: RePEc:cen:wpaper:16-54
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    File URL: https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2016/CES-WP-16-54.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Franchising; restaurants; data envelopment analysis; efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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