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A Property Rights Framework for Transit Services

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  • Klein, Daniel B.
  • Moore, Adrian T.

Abstract

The paper shows how variations in systems of property rights explain diverse experiences of urban jitneys and buses. Scheduled bus service entails route specific investments and cultivation of a market. If these investments can be expropriated by interloping jitneys, scheduled service will be dissolved. Property rights in curbspace determine whether scheduled service will be preserved, and whether jitney services will co-exist. We analyze the dynamics of thick and thin transit markets, with and without curb rights. We develop a governance system of curb rights that would let bus operators appropriate their own investments in scheduled service, yet would avoid monopoly by letting jitneys and competing scheduled services operate along the same route. A property rights system dispenses with government ownership, franchise contracting, and regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Klein, Daniel B. & Moore, Adrian T., 1995. "A Property Rights Framework for Transit Services," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt36f657t2, University of California Transportation Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt36f657t2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klein, Daniel B. & Moore, Adrian & Reja, Binjam, 1996. "Property Rights Transit: The Emerging Paradigm for Urban Transportation," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt0wg0x1mt, University of California Transportation Center.
    2. Bailey, Elizabeth E & Friedlaender, Ann F, 1982. "Market Structure and Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 1024-1048, September.
    3. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    4. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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