Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Joshua Aizenman, 2005. "Ex Ante Carrots instead of Ex Post Sticks: Two Examples," NBER Working Papers 11242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aizenman, Joshua, 2005. "Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt22k9w6ck, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Aizenman, Joshua, 2005. "Ex ante carrots instead of ex post sticks: two examples," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1jw476fz, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
References listed on IDEAS
- Laibson, David, 1998. "Life-cycle consumption and hyperbolic discount functions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 861-871, May.
- William Easterly, 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 223-250.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2002.
"Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 107-132, January.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Working Papers 0044, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," NBER Working Papers 7004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0044, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, 2004.
"International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 569-591, July.
- Joshua Aizenman & Nancy P. Marion, 2002. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," NBER Working Papers 9154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy P., 2003. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9s7978n1, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy P., 2003. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt9s7978n1, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Barro, Robert J, 1979.
"On the Determination of the Public Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
- Barro, Robert J., 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Scholarly Articles 3451400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992.
"Seigniorage and Political Instability,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-555, June.
- Alex Cukierman & Sebastian Edwards & Guido Tabellini, 1989. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," NBER Working Papers 3199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-561, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy, 2002.
"Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of International Credit,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(3), pages 631-649, August.
- Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, 1999. "Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of International Credit," NBER Working Papers 7202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rangan Gupta, 2005.
"Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(2), pages 263-288, November.
- Rangan Gupta, 2004. "Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements," Working papers 2004-33, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2005.
- Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, 2004.
"International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 569-591, July.
- Joshua Aizenman & Nancy P. Marion, 2002. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," NBER Working Papers 9154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy P., 2003. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt9s7978n1, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy P., 2003. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9s7978n1, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Horváth, Bálint L. & Huizinga, Harry, 2017.
"How does long-term finance affect economic volatility?,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 41-59.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry, 2016. "How Does Long-Term Finance Affect Economic Volatility?," Other publications TiSEM 7db601ec-af03-4f2b-aaa0-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Demirguc-Kunt,Asli & Horvath,Balint Laszlo & Huizinga,Harry P., 2016. "How does long-term finance affect economic volatility ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7535, The World Bank.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry, 2016. "How Does Long-Term Finance Affect Economic Volatility?," Discussion Paper 2016-005, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Horváth, Bálint & Huizinga, Harry, 2016. "How Does Long-Term Finance Affect Economic Volatility?," Other publications TiSEM 59312b2d-3418-4a1c-be24-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Huybens, Elisabeth & Smith, Bruce D., 1998.
"Financial Market Frictions, Monetary Policy, and Capital Accumulation in a Small Open Economy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 353-400, August.
- Elisabeth Huybens & Bruce D. Smith, 1996. "Financial Market Frictions, Monetary Policy and Capital Accumulation in a Small Open Economy," Working Papers 9608, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Xiaoqiang Cheng & Hans Degryse, 2010.
"The Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local Economic Growth in China,"
Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 179-199, June.
- Cheng, X. & Degryse, H.A., 2006. "The Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local Economic Growth in China," Other publications TiSEM 9ea9a2e7-97db-43bc-8405-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Cheng, Xiaogiang & Degryse, Hans, 2007. "The impact of banks and non-bank financial institutions on local economic growth in China," BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/2007, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
- Cheng, X. & Degryse, H.A., 2006. "The Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local Economic Growth in China," Discussion Paper 2006-82, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
- Joshua Aizenman & Kenneth Kletzer & Brian Pinto, 2007.
"Economic Growth with Constraints on Tax Revenues and Public Debt: Implications for Fiscal Policy and Cross-Country Differences,"
NBER Working Papers
12750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Kletzer, Kenneth, 2007. "Economic Growth with Constraints on Tax Revenues and Public Debt: Implications for Fiscal Policy and Cross-Country Differences," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9421k9hq, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Zhixiong Zeng, 2013.
"A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 729-754, March.
- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2010. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 24752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2011. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 33471, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998.
"Volatility and the Welfare Costs of Financial Market Integration,"
NBER Working Papers
6782, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 1998. "Volatility and the welfare costs of financial market integration," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1974, The World Bank.
- Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Smith, Bruce D. & Yip, Chong K., 2002. "Monetary Policy and Government Credit Programs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 232-268, July.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2010.
"Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1875-1891, September.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2007. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," Economie d'Avant Garde Research Reports 14, Economie d'Avant Garde.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2010. "Financing development: the role of information costs," Working Papers 2010-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2007. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," NBER Working Papers 13104, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2009. "Financing development : the role of information costs," Working Paper 08-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Jeremy Greenwood, 2007. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," 2007 Meeting Papers 171, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Greenwood, Jeremy & Sanchez, Juan M & Wang, Cheng, 2007. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12848, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Pavanini, Nicola & Ioannidou, Vasso & Peng, Yushi, 2019. "Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 13905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2002.
"Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 107-132, January.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Working Papers 0044, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," NBER Working Papers 7004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joshua Aizenman & Stephen Turnovsky, 1999. "Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard -- on Debtors or Creditors?," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0044, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Anne Villamil & Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma, 2004. "Enforcement and Firm Finance," 2004 Meeting Papers 868, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Slavtcheva, Dessislava, 2015. "Financial development, exchange rate regimes and productivity growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 109-123.
- Harold L. Cole, 2008.
"Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Harold L. Cole, 2008. "Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims," NBER Working Papers 14480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Spiros Bougheas & Paul Mizen & Cihan Yalcin, 2004. "Access to External Finance : Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Firm-Specific Characteristics," Working Papers 0406, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
- Jeffrey Lacker, 2001.
"Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
- Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1998. "Collateralized debt as the optimal contract," Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
More about this item
Keywords
TOT shocks; International reserves escrow account; fiscal reform; developing countries; buffer funds;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt22k9w6ck. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lisa Schiff (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecucsus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.