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Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Author

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  • Bardhan, Pranab
  • Singh, Nirvikar

Abstract

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Bardhan, Pranab & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1mg8p7tc, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt1mg8p7tc
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alonso, José Antonio, 2007. "Inequality, institutions and progress: a debate between history and the present," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    2. Breeta Banerjee & Amit Kundu, 2022. "Revisiting the Relationship Between Social Capital and Income of Informal Workers: An Empirical Analysis from Hooghly District of West Bengal, India," The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Springer;The Indian Society of Labour Economics (ISLE), vol. 65(3), pages 747-778, September.
    3. Joan Esteban & Esther Hauk, 2008. "Leadership in Collective Action," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 756.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Pranab Bardhan, 2005. "Institutions matter, but which ones?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(3), pages 499-532, July.

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